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Abstract. The paper analyses role of military spending and number of military personnel in 
India and Pakistan in conflict mitigation. The paper finds that Pakistan’s military spending 
is a cause of deterrence from Indian hegemony in the region confirming the defence 
literature that puts the role of military as a strategic asset for a country. The paper also 
suggests that both democracy and economic development puts downward pressures on 
India and Pakistan hostilities however democracy is not a sufficient condition in itself to 
mitigate conflict. The innovation of the paper is that it constructs real proxies of conflict 
from the defence literature and utilizes defence spending in the analysis as a means to a 
peaceful resolution between bilateral issues within South Asian region. 
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1. Introduction 
n national accounts budget deficits are usually higher among those 
developing countries that have higher defense expenditures. In addition 
to straining budgetary allocations towards a deficit, higher expenditures 
in defense also crowd out resources to be put on economic welfare of the 
population like education and health. Thus in economic jargon defense 
expenditures are considered as non-development expenditures to suggest 
that defense is more of a burden to national exchequer to be curtailed to 
put emphasis on progressive and pro-development policies for a country.  
The mainstream economics that talks about multilateral trading regimes 
and financial globalization has little appetite for national resources to be 
put on military build ups that may measure towards steps that may be put 
as nationalist, isolationist or belligerent towards other nations. North Korea 
is a good example to this effect where the country is not economically 
integrated with other countries in the region especially with its peaceful 
and more prosperous neighbors like South Korea. North Korea is by all 
means an economically struggling country with poor macro and micro 
economic governance and history of closed door policies practiced by one-
man dictatorial rule of Kim Jong Un. Instead of extending economic 
cooperation with neighbors, North Korea is mostly viewed as belligerent 
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towards neighbors especially South Korea with resources being put on 
measures like Missile and Nuclear programs and large military buildups 
while serious economic, social and political impediments remain for the 
majority population that suffer from malnutrition, poor health and 
education. In contrast South Korea represents a picture that is dominated 
by state measures towards greater economic, social and political welfare of 
the population indicating towards a prosperous, educated and healthy 
society. South Korea is also a well-meaning and well practicing democracy 
that has significantly improved its path to higher standard of living so 
much so that it is considered a middle income country. In contrast to North 
Korea, South Korea does not have higher military to GDP ratios further 
suggesting its national focus on economic welfare of the population. The 
opposing economic, political and social trajectories of these two neighbors 
suggest that military is a source of belligerence within a region and has no 
good place in economic management. However, the case of North and 
South Korea viz a viz contribution of military in economic development is 
not a rule. Countries maintain large armies not only for belligerence but for 
peaceful purposes also especially in a post 911 world where national 
security is compromised by acts of terrorism. One of the most salient 
examples come from South Asian region where military in Pakistan has 
been instrumental in taking actions against terrorist and extremist 
networks prevalent in tribal areas of Pakistan. A decade long armed action 
against the extremist networks by Pakistan Army lead to dismantling of 
these networks in tribal areas in Pakistan. Pakistan with its strong military 
has been instrumental in bringing peace to the region. In contrast the war 
trodden neighboring Afghanistan is still struggling to bring extremist 
forces to check despite billions of dollars on Afghan reconstruction efforts 
by United States. Furthermore, armed presence of NATO forces for more 
than two decades have been visibly failed to curtail the terrorist activity 
and attacks within many major cities in Afghanistan that still suffer from 
terrorist attacks on Afghan people and the government. Thus there is also a 
strong case for having a strong army to curtail unrest within a country to 
bring focus to measures on economic and social prosperity.  
The role of military is not limited to addressing civil unrest and conflict 
within the national borders but a military buildup also conforms to 
national capacity to deter outside aggression. Here the case of India and 
Pakistan is valid example when historic grievances in case of land dispute 
over Jammu and Kashmir has lead both countries to go for outright Wars in 
at least three occasions in 1965, 1971 and 1999 since their independence in 
1947. Since last two decades into 21st century, both India and Pakistan still 
suffered from the trust deficit especially arising out of events when terrorist 
struck Indian Parliament in 2008 or when Indian army received armed 
response from Kashmiris recently who have taken up arms against Indian 
state. Despite hostile rhetoric across borders it has not been translated into 
outright war. Due to strong defense in case of both Pakistan and India, 
deterrence has dominated over the politics of belligerence between India 
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and Pakistan. The recent example of the politics of belligerence within 
India is when Hindutva outcry manipulated for electoral gains by Modi 
government was responded by action of peace from Pakistan side as soon 
as India on February 2019 after Pulwama attack on its security forces sent 
fighter aircrafts into Pakistan on a pretext of so-called surgical strikes.  The 
Indian attempt to carry out surgical strikes in Pakistan was swiftly foiled 
by Pakistan Air Force and as a gesture of peace from a strong defense point 
of view, Pakistan released the Indian Pilot within the next day after he was 
gunned down with no conditions attached.  
The global political economy is also dominated by examples of active 
deterrence based on strong defense capabilities than acts of belligerence. 
The most salient example is the case of United States and China where 
unlike the precedence of Cold War Russia and the US, both powers have 
not opted for a military option to compete in their respective influence on 
neighboring Asia or regions as far as Africa. Instead economic measures 
have been taken to manage their respective global influence like in case of a 
trade war where US has imposed new tariffs on Chinese imports or China 
dominating world markets for its exports on account of devalued Chinese 
Yen. There are also strong examples of economic cooperation between the 
US and China where most of American companies have done multibillion 
dollars of outsourcing within mainland China.  
This paper analyse the role of military buildups by military personnel 
and military expenditure on dyadic proxies of conflict in case of India and 
Pakistan. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data 
Since interstate conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic 
concept. This current research involved constructing dyadic proxies for 
India-Pakistan interstate trade, military burden, development expenditure, 
economic development and democracy to test the hypotheses presented 
above. Data definitions appear in the appendix. 
Measuring conflict 
The literature on interstate conflict classifies conflict data sets into two 
categories: 1) war data and 2) events data (Polachek & Seiglie 2006). War 
data sets focus on the more hostile aspects of interstate interactions such as 
crises, wars or militarised interstate disputes (Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996). 
The most comprehensive war data set is available under the Correlates of 
War Project (COW), which has updated war data sets employed by Wright 
(1942), Richardson (1960), and Singer & Small (1972). The other major data 
set on interstate armed conflict is hosted by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Project (UCDP) with the collaboration of the International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on an annual basis and covers the 
full post-World War II period, 1946–2003.Events data focuses on all 
interstate events and bilateral interactions reported in newspapers. 
McClelland’s (1978) World Events Interaction Survey (WIES) is probably 
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the first of its kind based on bilateral interactions occurring during 1966-
1992, reported in The New York Times. Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace Data 
Bank (COPDAB) is an extensive longitudinal collection of about one 
million daily events reported from 47 newspaper sources between 1948 and 
1978. Since this paper is interested in the evolution of the India-Pakistan 
conflict over the last 55 years, the Uppsala/PRIO and COW interstate war 
data set will be used instead of events-based data sets because the former 
data sets provide conflict data, which covers most of the period of 55 years 
(1950-2005) selected for this analysis. Events data set is not available for the 
entire period. Although the events data set captures daily observations, the 
macroeconomic and democracy data varies annually, which limits the use 
of daily information on conflict. Hostility between India and Pakistan has 
been high most of the last 55 years, enabling the COW data set to capture 
the severity of conflict during most of the dispute. Greater coverage by the 
COW and Uppsala data sets, and availability of macroeconomic and 
democracy data on an annual basis limits the scope of using the events data 
sets.  
Six different measures of conflict are carefully compiled by using COW 
and Uppsala datasets: 
1. Annual fatality Levels ranging 0-6 (Fatal) 
2. Precise number of deaths (Volfatal) 
3. Number of days of conflict in a year (Dur) 
4.  Highest action in disputes taken by both India and Pakistan (Hiact) 
5. Annual hostility level severity (Hstlev) 
6. Conflict intensity ranging 0-2 (Cnf) 
There are several reasons for the selection of various proxies of conflict. 
The most appropriate proxy and the one which is most closely linked to 
conflict (or its severity) are number of deaths in the battlefield. Not only 
that, number of death variable has a higher level of variation among yearly 
observations but they are also more random, while subtly establishing 
nature of ongoing conflict which sometimes resulted in outright war. We 
know from Hstlevthat hostilities have remained high through out periods of 
1950-2007, but it is more interesting to know the ground realities of the 
battle field, where with the exceptions of three major wars when battle 
ground constitutes larger international borders between both States, 
Pakistan and India’s exchange of fire concentrates on the ‘Line of Control’. 
(See high conflict zone maps for India and Pakistan at the end of the 
chapter)  There are two proxies for number of deaths in battle field. One is 
Volfatalcapturing exact number of deaths and Fatal which capture annual 
fatality level to the scale of (0-6). Volfatal (exact number of deaths) have ever 
higher levels of variation among data, where number of deaths in three 
major wars (1965, 1971 and 1999), reached highest thresh-holds of conflict 
(in thousands) with declaration of outright war and thus would appear as 
out-liars in such instances in the long term conflict where number of deaths 
have remained low (less than a 100). In contrast, the variation because of 
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indexation in Fatal becomes more subtle as the score would only vary 
between 0 and 6.  
That makes Fatal a preferred proxy and Volfatal as the second best one. 
Dur (Days of conflict), Hiact (Higest Action in disputes) and Hstlev (Annual 
Hostility Levels) are also useful proxies. They capture the severity of 
conflict with a different angle. Inclusion of these measures in the analysis 
would help us carry out robustness check for the results on Fatal. Larger set 
of conflict measures would enable us to evaluate the statistical validity of 
the larger model. Furthermore, utilizing more proxies of conflict provides 
better insight into the nature of conflict, especially when causality tests are 
undertaken. Remember, Causality tests would show which measures of 
conflict (if employed more than one, as in our case) would have an effect on 
our endogenous independent variables (i.e, military burdern, bilateral or 
multilateral trade).  
 
2.2. Measuring international trade 
Generally, the sum of imports and exports between actor and target 
countries captures dyadic trade. (Polachek & Seglie 2006) In the last 60 
years the patterns of interstate trade between Pakistan and India changed. 
Before trade between both countries collapsed to near zero in the early 
1970s, Pakistan was exporting more to India. Since the 1970s, Pakistan 
imports more. In the 1950s, Pakistan and India’s trade with each other 
constituted a significant amount of their respective total trade. However, 
after the 1965 war, India-Pakistan trade never reached more than two per 
cent of their respective total trade levels. Until the late 1980s, India had 
been a relatively closed economy, whereas Pakistan has traditionally been 
more open. The researcher constructed two composite measures of India-
Pakistan trade. They are Pakistan’s total trade with India as a percentage of 
Pakistan’s total trade (Tpitp), and India’s trade with Pakistan as a 
percentage of India’s total trade (Tpiti). The expectation is for both trade 
proxies to relate negatively with conflict. It would be interesting to 
investigate whether trade between both countries as a share of each 
country’s total trade also affects the responsiveness of bilateral trade in 
conflict mitigation. If trade reduces conflict, trade with more countries 
should reduce conflict even more. (Dorussen, 1999) Thus, it is important to 
investigate how more trade with the rest of the world affects India-Pakistan 
hostilities. This research involves eight dyadic proxies to capture the 
combined international integration levels for both countries. Pakistan’s 
total trade as a ratio of India’s total trade (Xmpi), and its inverse, India’s 
total trade as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade (Xmip) are the first two 
indicators. If both of these trade proxies relate negatively with hostilities, 
the clear conclusion is that any external trade competition does not increase 
bilateral rivalry between India and Pakistan, but instead both countries 
have similar trade policies or could integrate within regional bodies like 
SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). However, 
any evidence of a positive relationship between conflict and these two 
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trade proxies would suggest that the competition in international markets 
has significant implications in sustaining their rivalry.  
 
2.3. Measuring military expenditure 
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence 
(Polachek & Seglie 2006). In the India-Pakistan case, it is vital to examine 
how each county’s military expenditure/military burden affects the 
dispute. Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP is higher than India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may 
also capture the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-
state conflict, the high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in 
various regions of India can also explain India’s military expenditures. 
Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military 
burden captures its security concerns vis-à-vis India solely. If so, dyadic 
variables that take the military burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian 
military burden, should affect conflict positively and vice versa. Here are 
the eight different dyadic proxies of military burden utilising data on 
military expenditures as well as military personnel constructed from 
Correlates of Wars.  
Military expenditures can either reflect aggression or deterrence, as we 
have posited above.  We need to examine country specific dynamics of 
military spending to find out how each country’s military 
expenditure/military burden affects the dispute. We already know that 
Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is 
higher than India’s (figure 3). Additionally, since military expenditures 
may also capture the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or 
intra-state conflict, Indian military expenditure can also be explained in 
terms of the high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various 
regions of India. Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that 
Pakistan’s military burden captures its security concerns principally vis-à-
vis India. Thus to go beyond  average dyadic investigation of the effect of 
military burden on conflict, we utilize 2 dynamic proxies of military burden 
which take military expenditure of Pakistan as a ratio of Indian military 
expenditure (Lmilbrd2) and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) in addition to taking 
average of India and Pakistan’s military expenditures (Lmilbrd1). If, as we 
speculate, Pakistan’s military burden is more closely related to conflict than 
India’s, Lmilbrd2 will have a positive sign and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) should 
have a negative sign, thus showing denominator effects of the inverse. (See 
Notes at the end of the paper for details)  
1. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s 
defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 1).  
2. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 2).  
3. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 3).  
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4. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over 
GDP (Lmilbrd4).  
5. Log of India’s defence expenditure average over GDP and 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd5).  
6. Log of Pakistan and India’s GDP weighted average of defence 
expenditures (Lmilbrd6). The proportion of military personnel to the 
total population represents the extent of militarisation in a society.  
7. Log of Pakistan military personnel over Pakistan’s total population 
as a ratio of India’s military personnel over India’s total population 
(LMilppi).  
8. Log of India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population 
(LMilppi).  
Note that the first two proxies are the inverse of each other and expected 
to reveal the relative sensitivity of each country’s military expenditure to 
conflict. Proxies 3 and 4 are a robustness check with military expenditures 
of each country divided by the combined military expenditure score of both 
countries. If Lmilbrd3 is positively associated with conflict, this hypothesis 
can substitute for Lmilbrd1. If Pakistan’s military expenditure is more 
closely associated with their bilateral conflict and if Indian military 
expenditure captures the element of deterrence, as well as belligerence with 
other national and international rivals, then the combined military 
expenditures should have lower explanatory value than Pakistan’s military 
expenditure alone but the sign for combined military score should remain 
positive. This paper strives to investigate the average effects of military 
expenditures by both countries on India-Pakistan rivalry by taking two 
more proxies of military burden. This is to investigate whether military 
burden has on average a conflict enhancing effect, irrespective of country of 
origin, after analysing its country specific application for deterrence or 
belligerence.   
 
2.4. Measuring democracy, growth and other variables  
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan required use of the 
Polity IV project hosted by The Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM). Polity IV computes a combined polity 
score by subtracting autocracy scores from democracy scores for the 
corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, 
where -10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 denotes the 
maximum democracy score. Although India always takes a high positive 
value of seven or above, Pakistan frequently takes on negative values. The 
next step involved constructing a dyadic variable of democracy for both 
countries by multiplying their Polity scores, following Polachek & Seiglie 
(2006), adding 10 to each country’s polity series to make the negative polity 
values positive so that the combined democracy score captures the 
variations in the democratisation process only on a positive scale. The 
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dyadic democracy variable shows values as low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 
400 when there are high levels of political dissimilarities between Pakistan 
(dictatorship) and India (democracy), and as high as 350 when both 
countries are governed by democracies (see figure 2).  
The weighted average of India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita 
growth rates (Gpi) represents the dyadic proxy of economic progress for 
both countries. Constructing the series for both countries involved taking 
GDP at constant prices (taken from economic surveys) and dividing it by 
population levels. The researcher tallied the data using the GDP per capita 
series available in the World Development Indicators (2006) data set. The 
four different proxies of social development based on India and Pakistan’s 
education data 1  are, GDP weighted average of per capita education 
expenditure; mean average of per-capita education expenditure; Pakistan 
and India’s education expenditures as a ratio of Pakistan and Indian’s GDP; 
and the average of Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of its 
GDP and India’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Note 
that the first two proxies employ per-capita education expenditure and the 
last two proxies employ total education expenditure. The purpose of the 
four education proxies is to perform a robustness check on the role of 
education in conflict mitigation. India and Pakistan are two of the most 
densely populated countries in the world. Pakistan has 160 million 
inhabitants, and India has more than one billion. In line with earlier 
literature, this thesis also uses the mean average of both countries 




Figure 1. Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India 
 
3. Methodology 
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results 
because of endogeneity problems among the variables (from trade, military 
spending, social sector expenditure and growth to conflict and vice-versa). 
It seems necessary to utilise a simultaneous equation model to address 
potential endogeneity problems between various variables. Since the data 
 
1 There is an insufficiently long time-series for public health spending data for India.  
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is a time-series, it is appropriate to use Vector Autoregressive model 
(VAR), which is an extension of univariate Autoregressive (AR) models to 
capture the evolution and the interdependencies between multiple time-
series. Treat all variables in a VAR symmetrically by including an equation 
for each variable explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the lags 
of other variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model 
depends upon the number of endogenous variables; each endogenous 
variable is regressed on its lagged value, and the lagged values of all other 
endogenous variables as well as any number of exogenous variables. This 
solves the problem of endogeneity among variables. In this sense, VAR 
model is a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with lagged 
variables and/or deterministic terms as common regressors so that one can 
interpret the regression results for each equation as ordinary least square 
estimators.  
 
The basic p lag vector autoregressive (VAR )( p ) model has the form 
 
tptpttt yyycY   ......2211     (1) 
 
where c is a )1( n vector of constants (intercept), i is a )( nn matrix 
(for every pi ,....,1 ) and t is a )1( n vector of error terms. 
 



















1,222     (3) 
 
The lag length p has to be determined by model selection criterion 
(MSC) because too many lagged terms will consume more degrees of 
freedom and may introduce the problem of multicollinearity. Introducing 
too few lags will lead to specification errors. One way of deciding this 
question is to use Akaike (AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) or Hannan Quinn 
(HQ) criteria and choose the model that gives the lowest values of these 
criteria. AIC criterion asymptotically overestimates the order with positive 
probability, whereas BIC and HQ criterion estimate the order consistently 
under general conditions if the true order p is less than or equal to maxp . 
After fitting a VAR, it may be important to know which way causalities 
run. One way to do that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR 
analysis. In a bivariate VAR model, a variable 2y  is said to Granger-cause a 
variable 1y  if, given the past values of 1y , past values of 2y are useful for 
predicting 1y . Similarly it is feasible to extend the current analysis to test 
Granger-causality for multivariate VAR ( p ), where ),......,,( 21  ntttt yyyY .  
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4. Results with VAR models  
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression 
analysis. As we can see, the data set is purely time series, which may mean 
that most of the variables may simply only follow a random walk. 
Generally that is the case with most time series. (See detailed Notes at the 
end of the paper)  If a regression employs non-stationary or a mix of 
stationary and non-stationary variables, the error term would suffer from 
autocorrelation which would in turn mean that the error term obtained 
from such a regression would also be non-stationary. Generally, non-
stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first difference of the 
series. However, it is not necessary to always take first differences, and 
stationary may be achieved at levels by taking time lags of variables where 
time trends or random walks would not be observed anymore.   
 
 
Figure 2. Pakistan and India’s Dyadic Growth Rates 
 
As we have taken dyadic proxies, the problem of random walk may be 
minimised and we may obtain stationarity for our variables at levels rather 
than first differences. Table 1 undertakes unit root analysis to test for 
stationarity in the dyadic variables under the modified or augmented  
Dickey-Fuller t test (DF-GLS) proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg & Stock 
(1996), where each series is transformed via a generalised least squares 
(GLS) regression before performing the test. The results show that we could 
effectively solve for unit-roots (random walk) at levels, although for some 
variables we only obtain stationarity after quite a number of lags. In case of 
Tpitp, taking lags up to 15 periods solves for the random walk. By contrast, 
the economic development variable capturing the dyadic growth rates for 
India and Pakistan (Gpi) has been observed to be a perfectly stationary 
series (figure 1). Unit-root test confirms this observation; stationarity is 
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Table1. DF-GLS unit root tests 
Variables Lag With intercept With intercept and trend 
Fatal (annual fatality levels, 0-6) 1 -3.528*** (Ng-Perron) -3.774*** (Ng-Perron) 
Volfatal (precise numbers) 1 -4.789* **(Ng-Perron) -4.844*** (Ng-Perron) 
Dur (days of conflict) 1 -4.058* **(Ng-Perron) -4.233***(Ng-Perron) 
Hiact (highest action in disputes) 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron) 
Hstlev (annual hostility levels, 1-5) 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512  (Ng-Perron) 
Cnf (conflict intensity ranges given by the PRIO-
Uppsala data set) 
1 -3.025* **(Ng-Perron) -4.082***  (Ng-Perron) 
Tpitp (Pakistan-India bilateral trade as a proportion 
of Pakistan’s trade) 
15 -1.112* (Ng-Perron) -1.861  (Ng-Perron) 
Tpiti(Above as a proportion of Indian trade) 15 -3.856***  (MAIC) -3.319** (Ng-Perron) 
Xmpi(Pakistan’s total global trade as a ratio of India’s 
global trade) 
2 -2.710*** (Ng-Perron) -2.860* (Ng-Perron) 
Xmip (inverse of the above) 8 -4.951***  (MAIC) -4.923***   (MAIC) 
Lxpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and 
India’s total exports) 
0 2.951** (D-Fuller) 2.951**  (D-Fuller) 
Lxpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total exports over 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total exports over India’s 
GDP) 
0 -4.769*** (SIC) -4.929*** (SIC) 
Lmpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and 
India’s total imports) 
1 -4.049*** (SIC) -3.961*** (SIC) 
Lmpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total imports as a 
proportion of Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total 
imports as a ratio of India’s GDP) 
1 -4.511*** (SIC) -4.382*** (SIC) 
Lmilbrd1 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over 
Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP) 
5 -2.209** (Ng-Perron) -2.795* (Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd2 (Inverse of the above) 5 -2.209**(Ng-Perron) -2.795*(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd3 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over 
Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP) 
5 -1.911*(Ng-Perron) -2.686*(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd4 (Log of India’s defence expenditure over 
India’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP) 
5 -2.128*(Ng-Perron) -2.831*(Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd5 (Log of Mean of India’s defence expenditure 
over GDP and Pakistan’s defence expenditure over 
GDP) 
1 -4.735*** (SIC) -4.748*** (SIC) 
Lmilbrd6 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan 
and India’s defence expenditures) 
0 - -4.308*** (SIC) 
Lmilppi (Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over 
Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of India’s 
military personnel over India’s total population) 
1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC) 
Lmilpip (inverse of the above) 1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC) 
Ledupi1 (log GDP weighted average of per capita 
education expenditure in India and Pakistan) 
1 - -5.374*** (SIC) 
Ledupi2 (log mean of per capita education 
expenditure in India and Pakistan) 
1 - -5.478*** (SIC) 
Ledupi3 (log of Pakistan and India’s education 
expenditures as a ratio of both GDPs) 
1 -5.918*** (SIC) -5.907*** (SIC) 
Ledupi4 (log of average of Pakistan’s education 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s education 
expenditure over GDP) 
1 - -5.642*** (SIC) 
Gpi(weighted average of GDP per capita growth rates 
for both countries) 
0 -4.256*** (Ng-Perron) -4.276*** (Ng-Perron) 
Demopi (combined democracy scores) 7 -2.790*** (Ng-Perron) -2.997*** (Ng-Perron) 
Poppi (average of total populations) 10 - -7.392*** (MAIC) 
Notes: -***, ** and *shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level. -The Lag structure is selected 
through (1) Ng-Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) Dickey-
Fuller test (D-Fuller).  
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Proxies treated as endogenous variables include those for conflict, 
bilateral and multilateral trade, economic progress, military burden and 
social development; whereas the concepts treated as purely exogenous are 
dyadic democracy and population. Since, these time-series variables are 
stationary at levels, although with some time lags, this allows the use of 
unrestricted VAR analysis instead of restricted VECM methodology. It is 
now possible to proceed to VAR analysis. The reduced form VAR model 
for conflict is as follows 
 
tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf   87,6,5,4,3,21    (4) 
 
Where 
tConf , itTr  , itMil  , itE  , itG  , tDemo and tP depict interstate 
conflict, bilateral or multilateral trade, military burden, education 
expenditure, real growth rate of GDP per-capita, dyadic democracy score 
and population respectively; t ranges from 1950-2007 and pi ,....,1 . Here
p is the optimal lag structure for the VAR model. 
it,2 it,3 it,4 it,5 and
it,6 are )66(  metrics (for every pi ,....,1 ). 
Running the above model for the number of fatalities (Fatal), best 
captures the severity of the militarised conflict between the two nations. 
Later analysis employs other conflict proxies.  
Table 2 shows the results for bilateral trade with the eight proxies of 
military burden proposed. The evidence suggests that trade between 
Pakistan and India significantly decreases hostilities between both nations. 
However, the low values of 
it,3 coefficients suggest that bilateral trade has 
a limited role to play in conflict mitigation. This is not surprising because 
trade between Pakistan and India remained very low, and comprises only a 
small fraction of each country’s total international trade. Although low 
trade levels between both countries may very well be the cause of the 
ongoing conflict, the current analysis does not need to be concerned with 
reverse causality because the VAR model takes care of potential 
endogeneity problems between Fatal and TpitporTpiti. On the other hand, 
Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3, Lmilbrd4, Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd6 all relate 
significantly with conflict, especially in the case of Tpitp. Lmilbrd1 and 
Lmilbrd3 relate negatively with conflict, and Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 
positively relate with conflict. This confirms the hypothesis that Pakistan’s 
high military expenditure is a close determinant of the India-Pakistan 
conflict.  
The high values of the 
it,4 coefficients in this case indicate that any 
increase in military expenditure by Pakistan when compared to India 
correlates with higher conflict. However negative signs of Lmilbrd2 and 
Lmilbrd4 also suggest that India’s military expenditure is weakly related to 
conflict whereas as Indian military expenditure is also directed at its 
domestic civil wars and security concerns with other states and thus in the 
case of Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 the explanatory power 
comes from Pakistan’s military expenditure. Furthermore, combined 
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military scores in Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd5 relate positively with conflict and 
the relationship is significant for both proxies of bilateral trade. This result 
suggests that irrespective of Indian security concerns national or 
international, or Pakistan’s anxieties about Indian hegemony, military 
expenditures on average do not have deterrent effect (in terms of fewer 
fatalities), but high military expenditures by both sides show some 
evidence of an arms race. The insignificance of Lmilppi and Lmilpip may 
also indicate the transformation of contemporary conventional war tactics, 
in which military size per se has a limited role in providing strategic depth. 
However the negative sign of Lmilppi and the positive sign of Lmilpip hints 
that higher militarisation in Pakistan may very well be an outcome of the 
ongoing hostilities between the two nations, as higher Pakistani military 
personnel has a deterrent effect, and the converse is true for India. 
Education expenditures Ledupi1 and growth rates Gpi relate significantly to 
conflict mitigation, and the size of coefficients suggests that the potential 
for spending on education in decreasing hostilities is quite substantial. 
Democracy also decreases the severity of conflict, but the low values of 
coefficients show the relationship is quite weak.  
Table 3 present results for multilateral trade with various proxies of 
military burden. In combination with various proxies of multilateral trade, 
the explanatory power of Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 
reduced, as they are generally insignificant, but the coefficients also reduce, 
especially for Xmpi and Xmip. The only military burden proxy that is 
consistently significant and comes out with the right sign is Lmilbrd6. This 
means that the present conclusion about the average conflict-enhancing 
role of military expenditures remains unaltered. Results in Table 3 also 
show that Xmpi is generally insignificant, whereas Xmip is significant in 
nearly all specifications. This is an interesting result, which suggests that 
higher Indian levels of trade integration mitigate conflict more than when 
Pakistani openness rises. However, the negative signs for both proxies 
confirm that greater openness in either country would significantly 
decrease conflict. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that there is no 
rivalry between India and Pakistan in terms of their trade with the rest of 
the world, and any competition to capture international market share is 
healthy. Table 6.3C shows results for average trade scores for both 
countries differentiated by exports and imports. Exports by both countries 
to the rest of the world relate negatively with conflict and the relationship 
is significant at the one per cent level. Also, note that the values of
it,3  
increased further for combined exports when compared with the results in 
Table 2, indicating that the more these two countries are able to export to 
the rest of the world, the lower the levels of bilateral conflict. The high 
coefficients of Xmpican lead the inference that the explanatory power for 
Xpi comes more from the Indian side. Both countries are at similar rungs on 
the technological ladder and share the potential to export to the rest of the 
world, along with countries like China. In contrast to exports, results on 
Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 show that rising imports do not increase hostilities, as the 
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signs are always negative but the overall insignificance of combined import 
scores mean imports may not exert any negative pressure on hostilities 
either. The results for education expenditure, economic performance and 
democracy remain unchanged. 
 
Table 2. VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of bilateral trade 
and military burden 
Right Hand Side 
Variables 
Left Hand Side Variable : Fatal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Bilateral Trade               
Tpitp (16) -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0..28*** -0.24** -0.23** -0.22**        
Tpiti (16)        -0.76* -0.76* -0.83** -0.70* -0.61* -0.64* 0.55* 
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃               
lmilbrd1 (6) 2.33*       2.02       
lmilbrd2 (6)  -2.33*       -2.02      
lmilbrd3 (6)   6.53*       6.03     
lmilbrd4 (6)    -3.45       -2.84    
lmilbrd5 (2)     6.84**       6.54**   
lmilbrd6 (1)      3.26*       3.52*  
Lmilppi(2)       -1.80        
Lmilpip(2)              1.79 
Social Development               
Ledupi1(2) -4.98 -4.98 -4.83 -5.9* -6.35** -8.34*** -6.08** -6.7* -6.7* -6.9* -6.2* -5.9** -8.35*** -6.10** 
Economic Growth               
Gpi (1) -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.31*** -0.38*** -0.37*** 
Exogenous Variables               
Demopi (7) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003* -0.004* 
Poppi (10) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.112*** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.07*** 
               
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57 
VAR(p) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) 
Notes:  -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR 
model. based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC) 
 
Table 3. VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of multilateral 
trade and military burden 
Right Hand Side 
Variables 
 Left Hand Side Variable : Fatal 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Mutilateral Trade               
Xmpi(3) -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.62 -0.77* -0.75*        
Xmip(9)        -3.74*** -3.74*** -3.77*** -3.74*** -3.89*** -2.68*** -3.83*** 
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃̃               
lmilbrd1 (6) 0.08       -0.18       
lmilbrd2 (6)  -0.08       0.18      
lmilbrd3 (6)   0.91       0.27     
lmilbrd4 (6)    -0.58       0.50    
lmilbrd5 (2)     0.04       -0.49   
lmilbrd6 (1)      3.38**       2.26*  
Lmilppi(2)       -1.02        
Lmilpip(2)              0.92 
Social Development               
Ledupi1(2) -3.64*** -3.64*** -3.59*** -3.69*** -3.60*** -8.07*** -2.85*** -4.73*** -4.73*** -4.67*** -4.79*** -4.44** -7.70*** -4.22*** 
Economic Growth               
Gpi (1) -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.39*** 
Exogenous Variables               
Demopi (7) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
Poppi (10) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.094*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.101*** 0.075*** 
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
Notes: -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR 
model based. on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
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It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests to see 
if causality runs from the determinants of conflict-to-conflict, and whether 
there are cases of reverse causality. This research included Granger 
causality tests for each VAR specification, presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 4 provides a summary of Granger causality tests for all endogenous 
regressors of conflict, and where there is an instance of reverse causality, it 
is noted. The results in Table 4 show that all regressors except Lmilppi, 
Lmilpip, Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 Granger cause conflict. There were also 
observations of some instances of reverse causality, especially for Tpitp, 
Tpiti, Lmilbrd5, Lmilbrd6, Ledpi1, Ledupi2 and Ledupi4 in case of 
Fatal,Lmilbrd6 in case of Volfatal, lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of 
Cnfpi,Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Dur, Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in 
case of Hstlvl and Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Hiact.  
 
Table 4. Granger causality Wald tests 
Direction of Causality  Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC 
FatalTpitp   (√)*** (√)* VolfatalGpi   (√)*** × 
FatalTpiti   (√)* (√)** CnfpiLxpi 2  (√)*** × 
FatalXmpi   (√)** × CnfpiLmilbrd 3  (√)*** × 
FatalXmip   (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 4  (√)*** × 
FatalLxpi 1  (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 6  × (√)* 
FatalLxpi 2  (√)*** × CnfpiLedupi 1  (√)* (√)* 
FatalLmpi 1  × × CnfpiGpi   (√)*** × 
FatalLmpi 2   × × DurLxpi 2  (√)*** × 
FatalLmilbrd 1  (√)** × DurLmilbrd 3  (√)*** × 
FatalLmilbrd 2  (√)** × DurLmilbrd 4  (√)** × 
FatalLmilbrd 3  (√)*** × DurLmilbrd 6  × (√)* 
FatalLmilbrd 4  (√)*** × DurLedupi 1  (√)*** (√)*** 
FatalLmilbrd 5  (√)*** (√)** DurGpi   (√)*** × 
FatalLmilbrd 6  (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLxpi 2  (√)*** (√)* 
FatalLmilpip   × × HstlvlLmilbrd 3  (√)** × 
FatalLmilppi   × × HstlvlLmilbrd 4  (√)* × 
FatalLedupi 1  (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLmilbrd 6  × (√)*** 
FatalLedupi 2  (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLedupi 1  × (√)*** 
FatalLedupi 3  (√)*** × HstlvlGpi   (√)* × 
FatalLedupi 4  (√)*** (√)* HiactLxpi 2  (√)** (√)* 
FatalGpi   (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 3  × × 
VolfatalLxpi 2  (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 4  × × 
VolfatalLmilbrd 3  (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 6  × (√)*** 
VolfatalLmilbrd 4  (√)*** × HiactLedupi 1  (√)* (√)** 
VolfatalLmilbrd 6  (√)*** (√)* HiactGpi   (√)* × 
VolfatalLedupi 1  (√)*** ×    
Notes. ***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse causation, 
√ means causes and × means not causes 
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The reverse causality in the India-Pakistan bilateral trade measures 
show that low levels of trade are also an outcome of the India-Pakistan 
conflict, which has spanned more than 50 years. Any decrease in hostility 
levels would also exert a positive and favourable effect on bilateral trade, 
which would create fertile ground for dispute resolution. Thus, more 
bilateral trade through reduction of tariffs is a noteworthy confidence 
building measure. The presence of reverse causality in average military 
spending is also not a surprise. This means that the India-Pakistan conflict 
is a significant cause of historically high military expenditures between 
both countries. Especially if high levels of conflict between India and 
Pakistan lower India’s military expenditure as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
military expenditure, then Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 would relate positively 
with conflict, which is the case in Tables 2. In light of the results, one 
interpretation may be that a military build-up by Pakistan increases as a 
response to conflict. This may be true because the dominant role of the 
army and high military expenditures in Pakistan are justified due to 
continuous high levels of hostility with its neighbour. Otherwise, Pakistan 
does not have any major dispute with any other nation, or frequent 
instances of intra-state disputes to justify the high budget allocation for 
defence. Reduction of hostilities would thus favourably affect the military 
burden in both countries, and both India and Pakistan could have more 
resources to channel towards its development and poverty reduction 
strategies. The reverse causality from conflict to education expenditure 
could explain this process.  
Reverse causality between conflict measures and proxies of education 
expenditure highlight the resource constraints faced by both sides due to 
their rivalry where funds allocated to defence seem to crowd out public 
investment in the development sector. Also found is reverse causality 
between Lxpi2, Hstslvl and Hiact. This result highlights the economic 
implication of conflict. If hostility levels rise and conflict moves closer to 
outright war, it will strangle export capability with the rest of the world for 
both countries. This will have negative effects on growth potential as well. 
For example, right after the 1971 and 1999 wars between Pakistan and 
India, total trade shares for both countries witnessed a deep decline. 
Economic growth Granger causes conflict and the relationship is negative. 
The growth patterns of both countries are independent of conflict, as far as 
reverse causality is concerned. The relationship is highly significant at a 
one per cent level in all the observed instances of Table 4. Any slowdown in 
growth rates in either of the two nations seems to correlate positively with 
conflict and this trend has been present since 1950.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Previous studies on the subject have measured conflict between both 
countries through their military expenditures. Such studies have put the 
blame on Pakistan for rising hostilities between two countries as Pakistan’ 
military budget as a proportion to GDP is much higher than that of India. 
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However analysis in this paper refutes such claims. As per the practice in 
defence literature, this paper considers military expenditures as strategic 
assets and they are interacted with real proxies of conflict such as hostile 
actions and threats of using force by India or Pakistan and fatalities caused 
by cross border military actions. The study finds that Pakistan’s military 
expenditures always rise when fatalities of the conflict rise. But the rising 
military expenditures in Pakistan in return cause a fall in the threat level of 
a possible hostile action from Indian side resulting in ex post fall in 
fatalities. Eventually, the rise in military expenditures in Pakistan in 
response to rise in military expenditures in India is good for peace between 
both countries as the former create significant deterrence against the 
possibility of hostile actions from Indian side. 
 The author also extends the analysis to capture political and economic 
linkages of the conflict. Note that the time period utilized in the study is 
from 1950-2007, thus capturing the historic dynamics of conflict as well as 
more contemporary economic explanations to it. The study finds that 
economic development abates the possibility of conflict and brings both 
countries closer to peace.  However there is also evidence of economic 
competition. If Pakistan is able to export more to the outside world, 
hostility would rise from the Indian side. The converse is not true. Pakistan 
is again a peaceful nation when comes to trade competition. The evidence 
in this regards comes in 2002, when India tried to restrict Pakistan’s trading 
capabilities by unilaterally amassing troops in Pakistani borders. 2002 is the 
year when Pakistan started to witness an economic come back from the 
economic crunch of the 1990s. Later in 2007 Pakistan also lost GSP+ 
arrangement in EU on an Indian complain to WTO.  GSP+ provided 
Pakistan increased market access to EU for its products. Ever since GSP + 
was taken away, Pakistan’s market shares in EU have been declining. 
Though military expenditures and economic development have been 
found to play a vital role in promotion of peace between India and Pakistan 
through deterrence effect, democracy in Pakistan also abates hostilities. 
Another important finding of the paper is that rise in education 
expenditures would bring both countries closer to the practice of real 
democracy and increase the possibility of peaceful solution to bilateral 
issues.  Here comes the paradox highlighted by the paper that high military 
expenditures squeeze education budgets in Pakistan and India, thus 
limiting the possibility of peace. In an ideal scenario, Pakistan and India 
should both curtail military budgets by focusing more on peace than 
conflict. 
 
6. Notes on empirical results 
6.1. Granger causality and military burden  
Table 4 high-lights the country specific dynamics of military burden in 
India and Pakistan and nature of conflict. For example, if conflict lasts for 
more days, or hostilities rise or severity of action (i.e., in extreme case of out 
right war) rise between both parties, all would have a significant and 
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positive shock on military expenditures in India and Pakistan as there is a 
presence of reverse causality between Lmilbrd6 and these measure of 
conflict but no presence of causality. No presence of causality means that 
arms race between India and Pakistan (Lmilbrd6) would not lead to rise in 
hostilities, neither increase the yearly duration of the conflict or lead to 
highest action (out-right war). This is an important result suggesting that 
higher military expenditures by both sides also have a deterrent effect on 
conflict, but if fatalities in the conflict rise, it will put a positive pressure on 
other measures of conflict, which in turn have positive shock on the arms 
race because we also find in table 4 that Lmilbrd6, in presence of reverse 
causation, appears to also positively and significantly cause Fatal or Volfatal. 
In contrast, Lmildbrd1,Lmildbrd2, Lmildbrd3and Lmilbrd4, which are dynamic 
interactions of Indian and Pakistani military expenditures, significantly 
cause conflict while there is no reverse causation. This points out towards 
the prevalent mistrust between both parties and the reason behind the arms 
race, where Pakistan’s military expenditure is more sensitively related with 
conflict than the Indian military expenditure. Though, Pakistan may see its 
rise in military expenditure as deterrence to match Indian military 
expenditure, it would in effect has a positive effect on conflict as it would 
sustain hostilities between both parties at not only higher levels of severity 
but also the duration of the conflict on average would rise. Furthermore, 
Hiact (highest action in conflict) is not affected by military expenditures as 
all measures of military burden do not cause Hiact, though in case of 
Milbrd1, highest action in conflict positively influence the former 
suggesting that outright wars or increase in the severity of action would 
put upward pressure on the military expenditures of Pakistan and India 
much equally. In case of war, one may explain this relationship by simply 
suggesting that Pakistan and Indiaspend more resources on military 
procurement to cover such depleted military assets which have been 
increasingly utilized in the conflict.  
 
6.2. Taking inverse ratios: ‚What they really show for military 
burden and trade?‛ 
The nature of variables is dyadic, corresponding to the analysis which is 
so common in conflict studies which investigate conflict in dyadic settings. 
However, defence or trade or democracy would provide results which may 
only capture dyadic effects while may not reveal some very important 
country specific information. For example, high military expenditure is 
conflict enhancing and higher bilateral or multilateral trade is conflict 
reducing. Such assertions may be substantiated by theory or empirics but it 
may suffer from one limitation: if the dyadic variables are constructed in a 
fashion that they only capture average effects of the two parties involved, 
(e.g. Lmilbrd6) results may be misleading as in reality, one party may be 
more relevant than other or the two parties may work in opposite 
directions. 
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For example, in our case, Pakistan’s military expenditure is seen as 
conflict enhancing especially by Indian side. However, Pakistan sees 
military expenditure as a deterrence from outside (i.e., Indian) aggression 
suggesting that actually Indian military expenditure is fuelling the conflict. 
Indian, in contrast, traditionally see its high military expenditure as a 
deterrence to not only outside aggression but also inside civil unrest, 
whereby India has a high concentration of its military resources in the 
region of Kashmir. In the conflict literature, military expenditures are 
assets, which represent national capabilities to not only deter international 
conflict but also curtail any such civil unrest which may be a risk for 
economic development at national level. Thus relationship between 
military expenditures and conflict is not a linear one but a very dynamic 
one. Even if our dyadic proxy of military expenditure, which may take an 
average of India and Pakistan’s military expenditure, has a positive 
relationship with Conflict between two nations, we cannot say with 
certainty whether such empirical finding may lead to the conclusion that 
Military expenditures are conflict enhancing. It may be that Pakistani 
military spending is conflict enhancing and Indian military spending show 
an effect of deterrence (which means conflict reducing). Or it may be the 
opposite case. Another scenario may be that high military expenditure in 
India may show rivalry with a third party (China, a case in point) and thus 
may not be relevant at all in our analysis, while Pakistan may indeed be 
addressing its concerns viz-a-viz Indian hegemony and spend high on 
military build-up as a matter of deterrence.  
Please note that it is to our discretion to put Pakistan or India as a 
numerator or denominator. Changing the position may have implications 
due to case sensitivities (as we would find in case of Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd2). 
For example Lmilbrd 1, where India is in the denominator, has a positive 
sign suggesting Lmilbrd1 is conflict enhancing. However, Lmilbrd 2, where 
Pakistan is in the denominator, has a negative relationship with conflict, 
suggesting on its face value that Lmilbrd2 is conflict reducing. Both results 
are conflicting. According to our hypothesis, military burden for India and 
Pakistan, both should be conflict enhancing. That we do find for Lmilbrd6, 
which is just average of both. Hence, in the light of Lmilbrd6 and its 
relationship with conflict, the signs of Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd2 actually give 
away important information, which is about relative importance of India 
and Pakistan’s military expenditure in the conflict. If conflict is more 
related with Pakistani military expenditure then in case Pakistan military 
expenditure goes into the denominator, the sign should change and it does 
change in our regression models quite consistently satisfying maximum 
number of robustness checks. In the light of these results, a positive sign of 
Lmilbrd6 suggests that Indian military expenditure also enhance conflict, 
but it is less relevant than the Pakistani one to explain severity of conflict 
between both nations.  
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In multilateral trade, inverse specifications serve this very analysis to 
investigate dyadic as well as country specific relationship to understand 
the dynamics of India-Pakistan conflict not only with its evolutionary 
settings but also with country specific perspective as to how trade may be 
related with conflict and thus suggest a peace strategy in rather 
comprehensive manner. For example, a higher coefficient of Xmipwhen 
compared to Xmpishows that any rise in Indian trade with rest of the world 
has a proportionally greater effect on conflict mitigation than a rise in 
Pakistan’s trade with rest of the world. Economic integration by Indian side 
would decrease costs of peace for India at a much greater pace than if 
Pakistan integrates with rest of the world. Our theoretical model has 
covered such dynamic trade-offs for India and Pakistan. In undertaking 
such empirical methodology (not to mention the utilization of VAR), 
chapter 6 confirms or rejects many assertions which are put forward in 
academic as well as popular literature to explain India-Pakistan conflict.  
 
6.3. Why Granger causality through a VAR? 
Since there is endogeniety problem between variables of interest, VAR 
can analyze the nature of relationship without assuming dependency of 
one variable over the other. Only granger causality tests, which follow VAR 
analysis, inform us about the direction of relationship and it may be the 
case, as we found in our analysis, the direction of relationship between a 
pair of variables is two way. This again is important information. Thus the 
purpose is to investigate nature (+ or -) of relationship between conflict 
variables and other endogenous independent variables (military burden, 
bilateral or multilateral trade, economic development etc), while also 
examining the direction of relationship. VAR provides one of the best time 
series methodologies. However, first we have to solve for random walk or 
trends in our time series variables. Since our variables of choice are dyadic 
in nature, we could solve for random walk at level instead of first 
difference. 
 As we can see, the data set is purely time series which 
may mean that most of the variables may suffer from random walk. 
Generally that is the case with most time series. If a regression employs non 
stationary or a mix of stationary and non-stationary variables, the error 
term would suffer from autocorrelation which would in turn mean that the 
error term obtained from such a regression would also be non stationary. 
Generally, non-stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first 
difference of the series. It is not necessary to always take first difference 
and stationary may be achieved at level by taking time lags of variables 
where time trends or random walk would not be observed anymore:  
1. Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics):  
(a) Mean reverting around a constant long-run mean 
(b) Constant variance which time-invariant 
2. Non Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics) 
(a) Has no long-run into which the series returns 
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(b) The variance depends on time and approached infinity as time goes 
to infinity 
(A) Types of Non Stationarity 
1.  The random walk model with drift:  
yt =  + yt-1 + ut  (5) 
2.  The deterministic trend process: 
 yt =  + t + ut (6.) 
3.  The explosive process: 
 yt =  + yt-1 + ut (7) 
where > 1. Typically, the explosive case is ignored and we use  = 1 to 
characterise the non-stationarity because:  
 
(a) > 1 does not describe many data series in economics and finance. 
(b) > 1 has an intuitively unappealing property: shocks to the system 
are not only persistent through time, they are propagated so that a given 
shock will have an increasingly large influence.  
(B) The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test 
Dickey and Fuller developed the basic test for unit roots and order of 
integration. The basic objective of the test is to test the null hypothesis that 
 =1 in: yt = yt-1 + ut against the one-sided alternative <1.  
So we have  
  H0: series contains a unit root  
 Vs.  H1: series is stationary.  
 
 
Figure 3. Properties of Times Series 
 
Plot of a stationary series Plot of Random Walk Series 
We usually use the more convenient regression: 
 
yt = γyt-1 + ut 
 
so that a test of =1 is equivalent to a test of γ=0 (since -1=γ). 
 
yt = yt-1 + ut , yt- yt-1 = yt-1 - yt-1 + ut, yt = (-1)yt-1 + ut 
 
Dickey and Fuller proposed three tests. The null (H0) and alternative 
(H1) models in each case are 
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This is a test for a random walk against a stationary autoregressive 
process of order one (AR(1)) 
 ii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut  H1: yt = yt-1++ut,<1 
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift. 
 iii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut  H1:yt = yt-1++t+ut,<1 
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift 
and a time trend. 
The three models can be described as cases with: 
 i) No intercept, no trend 
 ii) Intercept, no trend 
 iii) Intercept and trend 
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller 
extended their procedure suggesting an ‚augmented‛ version that uses p 
lags of the dependent variable 
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller 
extended their procedure suggesting an ‚augmented‛ version that uses p 
lags of the dependent variable. The alternative model in case (i) is now 
written: 
A problem now arises in determining the optimal number of lags of the 
dependent variable.  
There are 2 ways 
- use the frequency of the data to decide 
- use information criteria  
In our case, we have taken dyadic proxies, and thus the problem of 
random walk may have been minimised and we may obtain stationarity for 
our variables at level rather than first differences. 
 
6.4. Fatalities and trade relationship 
What would be the impact of a 100 percent increase in bilateral trade or 
multilateral trade on Conflict (fatalities)? For example, the coefficients in 
table 2 and 3 suggest if bilateral trade or multilateral trade doubles, 
fatalities (Fatal) would witness a decrease of at least 2 points or 200 percent 
in case of multilateral trade and only 20 percent (less than a half point) in 
case of bilateral trade. This means if Fatal have scored 5, and trade with rest 
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Generally, Fatal has taken up score of 3 or 2, which means usually battle 
deaths have been either 26-100 deaths in case of score 2 or 101-250 deaths in 
case of score 3. With high coefficients of multilateral trade in reducing fatal, 
one may confer that multilateral trade (relationship with outside world) 
traditionally have been playing a key role to contain fatalities and also 
possibility of out right war between India and Pakistan. In contrast, 
bilateral trade has much smaller effect in containing fatalities and thus 
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 Dyadic Variables 
 Conflict   
Cnfpi Intensity of Conflict between Pakistan and 
India, Scores 1 (minor) when 25 to 999 
battle-related deaths and 2 (war) when at 
least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given 
year, 
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Data set Version IV, Harbom et al. (2006) 
 
 
Dur Number of days a conflict lasts in a year 
between Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COWInter-State War 
Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004)  
Fatal Annual fatality level of conflict between 







6 >999 Deaths 
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COWInter-State War 
Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004) 
 
 
Hiact Highest action by Pakistan and India in 
annual corresponding dispute [bracketed 
numbers refer to corresponding hostility 
level] 
0    No militarised action [1] 
1    Threat to use force [2] 
2    Threat to blockade [2] 
3    Threat to occupy territory [2] 
4    Threat to declare war [2] 
5    Threat to use CBR weapons [2] 
6    Threat to join war [2] 
7    Show of force [3] 
8    Alert  [3] 
9    Nuclear alert   [3] 
10   Mobilisation   [3] 
11   Fortify border  [3] 
12   Border violation   [3] 
13   Blockade [4] 
14   Occupation of territory  [4] 
15   Seizure    [4] 
16   Attack     [4] 
17   Clash       [4] 
18   Declaration of war    [4] 
19   Use of CBR weapons  [5] 
20   Begin inter-state war   [5] 
21   Join inter-state war    [5] 
 
 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COWInter-State War 
Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004) 
Hstlev Annual hostility levels reached by India 
and Pakistan in each annual corresponding 
dispute 
No militarised action 
Threat to use force 
Display of force 
Use of force 
War 
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al. (2004) 
 
VolFatal Precise volume of fatality in each annual 
corresponding dispute, 
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State War 
Data, Version 3.02 (Faten et al. 2004), CSCW/PRIO 
Battle Deaths data (Lacina 2005), CSP Data set on 
Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm 
 Bi Lateral Trade  
Tpitp Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India 
as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade, 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF) 
Tpit Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India 
as a ratio of India’s total trade, 
 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF) 
 Multilateral Trade  
Xmpi Pakistan’s total trade (exports + imports) as 
a ratio of India’s total trade (exports + 
imports). 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF)  
 
Xmip India’s total trade (exports + imports) as a Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
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ratio of Pakistan’s total trade (exports + 
imports). 
Statistics 2007 (IMF) 
 
Lmpi1 Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan 
and India’s total imports. 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 20067(IMF) 
Lmpi2  Log mean average of Pakistan’s total 
imports as a proportion of Pakistan’s GDP 
and India’s total imports as a ratio of 
India’s GDP. 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2008 (IMF) 
 
Lxpi1 Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan 
and India’s total exports. 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2008 (IMF) 
Lxpi2 Log mean average of Pakistan’s total 
exports over Pakistan’s GDP and India’s 
total exports over India’s GDP. 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International Financial 
Statistics 2008 (IMF) 
 Military Burden  
Lmilbrd1 Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over 
Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP, 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd2 Log of India’s defence expenditure over 
India’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP, 
 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
Lmilbrd 3  Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure 
over Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
plus India’s defence expenditure over 
India’s GDP. 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
Lmilbrd 4 Log of India’s defence expenditure over 
India’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus 
India’s defence expenditure over India’s 
GDP. 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan  
Lmilbrd5 Log of Mean average of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP and Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over GDP. 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd6  Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan 
and India’s defence expenditures, 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics 
Year Book (IMF), Economic Survey of Pakistan, 
Economic Survey of India 
Lmilppi Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over 
Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of 
India’s military personnel over India’s total 
population. 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
Lmilpip Log of India’s military personnel over 
India’s total population as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s military personnel over 
Pakistan’s total population, 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war data 
set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 Economic Growth  
Gpi Weighted average of real GDP per capita 
growth rates for Pakistan and India,  
 
Years: 1950 to 2007. Sources: Pakistan Economic 
Survey, Indian Economic Survey, International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF) 
 Democracy  
Demopi Pakistan and India’s combined democracy 
score (by adding 10 to India and Pakistan’s 
Polity2 values for each year and then 
taking the product of these values in order 
to convert the variable in dyadic form), 
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Polity IV Project (Centre 
for International Development and Conflict 
Management) 
 
 Population  
Poppi Average of Pakistan’s total population and 
India’s total population 
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial 
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